Abstract

This paper seeks to propose a new theoretical framework for analyzing intelligence sharing practices in international organizations. Based on presumptions from regime theory, three propositions that can be used for analysis will be presented, developed from a combination of theories on optimum intelligence reach (Svendsen, 2012), delegation in international organizations (IO) (Hawkins et al., 2006), and hierarchy in intelligence sharing (Walsch, 2010). The applicability of the framework is demonstrated by an analysis of intelligence sharing practices in NATO. This analysis shows a discrepancy between NATO’s official ambitions for the organization’s intelligence sharing practices and the actual intelligence sharing that takes place. Furthermore, the ill-defined benefits and the potentially high cost of delegating authority to the agent prevent the states from giving NATO autonomy in the intelligence area. Subsequently, the lack of trust toward NATO’s intelligence sharing mechanisms, combined with the US-dominated power imbalance that exists within NATO makes it more desirable for states to engage in smaller hierarchical fora for intelligence sharing. The proposed framework for analysis presented here can hopefully inspire further development and expansion of the framework, as well as encourage future analyses of intelligence sharing practices in other IOs.

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