The debate in Europe about populism has been determined by the upsurge of the far-right and its impact on the political divide between center-left and center-right. However, the previous political situation in Latin America, with the formation of the Pink Tide and the convergence of different progressive presidents, and later in Europe, with the electoral victory of Syriza in Greece or the participation of Podemos in the coalition government in Spain, invite us to think about a very different type of populism. Rather than talking generally about populism (including left and right populism under the same category), it is convenient to see it in the light of the political left-wing (and its debates) and the changes and crises of the economic system, as well as the multiple forms of social protests and long term process which have affected the crisis of party system and its representativeness. In this regard, if we look back to the financial crisis in 2007-08 or the global cycle of protests initiated in 2011, the relevant questions are how to anchor left-wing populism in such processes and to what extent it has succeeded in paving a new political path.

Left-wing parties tried to respond to, at least, four question which helps us to understand why left populism emerged as an alternative approach within the Left tradition: 1) the economic question: the financial crisis, as well as the pandemic, evidenced forms of exploitation and inequality through precarization and social segmentation but also the need for collective (public or common) responses; 2) the corruption question: where corruption is not reduced to the working of parties but to the creation of political dependence on the economic interests of the elites; 3) the party system question: the loss of extra-parliamentary party organization and the cartelization of political parties which reproduce mainly their own interests and remove the demos from the center of democracy; and 4) the movement question: since the diversity of social movements has pointed out many problems affecting people that are not being addressed satisfactorily by political parties and how movements can inspire new organizational party forms. In my book Left-Wing Populism. The Politics of the People, I show how the responses to those questions provoke five points of tension:

• Sovereignty: There is a consensus on the divide “the people” vs. the elite as the main feature of populism and popular sovereignty consequently becomes one of the central claims of left populism. The reference to popular sovereignty, at the national level, implies rather the questioning of the instituted order and the need for opening new political and social spaces. This understanding of sovereignty as process to radicalize institutions should be accompanied by civil society and mechanisms of participation. At the international level, the opposition between “the losers of globalization” and global neoliberalism requires other forms of articulation which prevent the reduction of popular sovereignty to national sovereignty.
   
• Class and migration: the appeal to “the people” as the main political subject generates reluctance since it could imply the replacement of class as emancipatory project and the exclusion of migrants from “the people”. Since the conflict between “the elite” and “the people” is vertical and “the people” can be understood as plebs (“common people”, those excluded from political society), left-wing populism should move to renew the political articulation of class rather than abandoning it. It would entail introducing distinctions such as “class determination” and “class position” or to think about the potential of an intersectional populism to expand the category of class in an intersectional manner. Regarding migration, there should be no problem in including migrants as part of “the people” but we are witnessing how from the left (and the center-left and the right), migrants are indeed excluded in the name of class and national interests. Intersectional populism could be also be useful here to develop “the people” as an inclusionary category, making room for both class and migration.
   
• Nationalism: Populism and nationalism sometimes work interchangeably. This makes it difficult to distinguish between them and it can result in equating left and right populism as national projects. For this reason, it is important to see how far left-wing populism can promote an emancipatory project without being reduced to nationalism. Besides distinguishing between “the people” and “the nation”, two trends can be identified in this sense: the delimitation of sovereignty and patriotism. On the one hand, regaining sovereignty is mainly formulated in economic terms against transnational economic power which allows for solidary positions in situations like the so-called “refugee crisis” where left populism parties did not advocate for retrieving national sovereignty by reinforcing borders. On the other hand, sovereignty is not homogenous and national sovereignty can be compatible with other sovereignties (that is the case of Podemos when they talk about plurinationality). Probably with the aim to distance themselves from nationalism, left populism embraces patriotism and the redefinition of the homeland as the interests and needs of “the people” which should be defended basically through public policies and welfare. The patriotic impetus is, thus, an attempt to combine the affectual dimension of politics and loyalty to “the people” with the loyalty towards democratic institutions.
   
• Institutions: Left-wing populist parties have often been victims of their own anti-institutional rhetoric and have faced serious problems in replacing their position when they have become part of the institutional realm. In fact, populism has ended up being reduced to a strategy to reach power or institutional representation. Therefore, the discussion between populism and republicanism is usually presented in terms of incompatibility rather than dialogue. Returning to the idea of popular sovereignty as a process towards deepening democratic institutions, populism can be useful to challenge the existing institutional framework and try to renew it. “The people” is not supposed to replace the laws but left-wing populism should increase democratic control, including the division of power, and democratize institutions. A fruitful combination of populism and republicanism which maintains the institutional focus and the conflictual approach should highlight that institutions must serve “the people” and not be appropriated by elites.
   
• Internationalism: Another important limitation of populism is that its scope of action has been limited to domestic politics and its internationalization refers to the rejection of transnational political and economic elites. The opposition to globalization when associated with cosmopolitanism entails the risk of a return to nationalism as the best option. The same happens with the defense of sovereignty against globalization that ends up becoming a defense of national sovereignty. Parties have carried out a strategy of international sovereignism (like the launch of Plan B or the European Parliament electoral alliance “Now the People”) where the reinforcement of national sovereignties coexist with a diffuse position about what to do with the European Union (if a progressive project is possible within or only outside of the EU). On the contrary, DiEM25 has supposed an attempt of transnationalism by overcoming the centrality of the nation-state level. The construction of a European demos and, especially, the lack of national and local implementation have proven to be complicated. Since the left has not gained power at the European level, the way towards an internationalist left populism, if possible, is not clearly defined yet.
  Despite these critical points, it would be erroneous to think that the time of left-wing populism is over, particularly because some of the structural reasons for its emergence are still present and require strategic thinking about how to face them. There have also been relevant achievements which the failures or a new sense of defeat of the left should not overshadow. However, left-wing populism has failed so far in substantially expanding the social and electoral basis of the left, despite some remarkable exceptions; the claim for overcoming ideological division has not resulted in less political fragmentation; there has been a reductionist understanding of hegemony, not paying attention to the economic and material forces to hinder political change; and the organizational party form has been characterized by internal conflicts and increasing centralized leadership. Does this imply that left-wing populism should be merely dismissed? Clearly not. The problem is to look at left populism as “the solution” and not a necessity, as expressed by other political and social actors, for how to face the current economic and political situation from a left perspective. This question still remains open. When we see an extended mistrust towards establishment parties, left wing should find a way of translating both discontent and hope into a stable political project.

Óscar García Agustín is author of Left-Wing Populism. The Politics of the People (Emerald, 2020). For more information: https://books.emeraldinsight.com/page/detail/LeftWing-Populism/?k=9781839092060